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Abstract
The observation of the nature and world represents the main source of human
knowledge on the basis of our reason. At the present it is also the use of precise mea-
surement approaches, which may contribute significantly to the knowledge of the
world but cannot substitute fully the knowledge of the whole reality obtained also
with the help of our senses. It is not possible to omit the ontological nature of mat-
ter world. However, any metaphysical consideration was abandoned when mainly
under the influence of positivistic philosophy phenomenological models started to
be strongly preferred and any intuitive approach based on human senses has been
refused. Their success in application region has seemed to provide decisive support
for such preference. However, it is limited practically to the cases when only inter-
polation between measured data is involved. When the extrapolation is required the
ontological models are much more reliable and practically indispensable in realistic
approach.
1 Introduction
Human knowledge is based on the ability of human reason. One starts from the pieces of
knowledge obtained by observation of the world (including human existence). All scientific
knowledge is based fundamentally on such an approach. The human reason forms some
generalized statements (or hypotheses) from the individual pieces with the help of logical
induction (event. of intuition). All possible consequences are then to be derived from all
these propositions with the help of logical deduction. The statements that do not lead
to any mutual contradictions and to any contradictions with world observation may be
denoted as plausible. In the case of a contradiction the given hypothesis (or a given set of
hypotheses) must be denoted as falsified. It is not possible to start from it in extending
our knowledge as far as it is not modified in corresponding way. However, the propositions
that have not been falsified may be denoted only as plausible. It is not possible to speak
about the verification of scientific theories; see [1].
The main role is played in this approach by natural science, especially by physical,
chemical, and also biological research. Such research might be hardly possible without the
help of mathematical models. The models used at the present should be divided into two
categories: phenomenological or ontological (denoted in biology usually as mechanistic).
We will discuss in the following the questions concerning the possibility of using different
models in extrapolation predictions and of their contributing to better understanding of
natural phenomena.
However, in Sec. 2 we will mention first shortly the possibility of human knowledge
and the problem of opinion plurality and in Sec. 3 the successive development of scientific
knowledge. The evolution of thinking with the coming of the new age will be mentioned
in Sec. 4. The mathematical modelling in natural sciences will be handled in Sec. 5.
The necessity of metaphysics will be stressed in Sec. 6. And the problem of intuitive
knowledge in the region of microscopic world will be analyzed in Sec. 7. Phenomenological
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characteristics remaining still necessarily in contemporary basic natural science will be
mentioned in Sec. 8.
2 Human knowledge and tolerance problem
It has been introduced already in the preceding section that our knowledge is based on
falsification approach. Any positive statement (proposition) may be shown or as falsified
or as plausible. It may be never denoted as verified. Consequently, two (or more) mutually
contradicting statements may be denoted as plausible if any of them has not been falsified
in tests performed in connection with an additional plausible statement set.
That may be denoted as the source of fully legitimate plurality of different opinions
(or also theories). The legitimate and fully justified tolerance must be exhibited towards
such statements. It means that also two alternative (different) theories should be taken
as plausible if they have not been falsified in separate tests. However, that is practically
excluded in the contemporary scientific approaches on the basis of falsifiability principle,
even if on the other side, the equivalent tolerance is often required in other regions (e.g.,
in the region of metaphysics) also for statements that have been already falsified in the
past. Such tolerance must be denoted as destructive, as it tends necessarily to an untrue
picture of the world or human being.
From the fact that the way to knowledge consists in the falsification approach it might
seem that practically nothing may be known with certainty. That holds actually for any
non-falsified positive statement; it can never be said that it holds actually and will hold
also in the future. However, the certain knowledge may exist; it consists of the whole set
of all falsifying statements. The certainty may be obtained always about what does not
hold; therefore, about what is not true.
3 Scientific knowledge and its evolution
The people were forced to learn to know the nature from the very beginning of their
existence to save or to lighten their lives. However, the actual beginning of systematic
(scientific) knowledge may be put into the old Greece approximately in the fifth century
b. C. The matter structure belonged always to basic considerations. Demokritos (cca 470-
360 b. C.) formulated the hypothesis about the existence of atoms (i.e., of furthermore
indivisible small bodies) that fill fully their internal space which is assumed to be otherwise
empty. From Leukippos he took over also the law of causality: Any thing does not arise
without a cause, but everything arises from some reason and necessity. Such intuitive
ideas and standpoints did not appear practically in other parts of the world.
The given intuitive approach was conserved also in the metaphysical (ontological) ap-
proach of Aristotle (384-322 b. C.), who put also the grounds to whole natural science
on the basis of world observation, even if his own statements about the world (starting
from the then observations) were later falsified. Aristotle did not limit himself, of course,
only to natural science based on direct world observation. Indivisible part of his con-
tribution was the metaphysical approach, when he formulated also different conclusions
following from the ontological nature of real matter objects. He formulated also the rules
of two-value logic on such a basis and developed further the causality principle.
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However, the approaches of Aristotle were not known in Europe practically for the
whole thousand of years a. C. Islam brought them to Europe only in the beginning of
the second millennium. They were taken over by Albert Magnus (1193-1280) and also
by Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), who then continued in developing further all previous
philosophical aspects. Thomas was developing, of course, also theological philosophy that
tended from the Christian revelation towards the matter world and had, therefore, a
source differing from that of metaphysics. It is then possible to say that Thomas was
distinguishing in principle always between these two different philosophical regions. And
the natural science was developing at that time always in full harmony with metaphysical
consideration, practically till the beginning of the new age.
It is possible to say that successive changes occurred when the followers of Thomas
Aq. were not able to continue in keeping the metaphysical consideration in agreement
with nature observations and took some metaphysical statements as dogmas. And also
some statements of natural sciences were not corrected in agreement with contemporary
observations and remained under the influence of different earlier convictions; e. g.,
F. Bacon (1561-1626) was speaking about different idola (mistakes). At that time the
importance of falsification approach was, of course, not yet known and realized.
4 Evolution of scientific thinking in the new age
A series of different ideas appeared gradually in the new age that were accepted as new
starting points for formulating corresponding scientific hypotheses. It is possible to say
that mainly three newly formulated concepts influenced the development of the modern
physics and whole natural science. It was the overestimation of the human reason by
R. Descartes (1596-1650), the refusal of causality and the overestimation of chance in
natural evolution by D. Hume (1711-76) and the positivist philosophy of A. Comte (1798-
1857) who limited all considerations to mere measured data and refused any metaphysical
thinking. It was probably also the discovery of molecular and atom structures in the 18th
century that contributed at least partially to these trends as the probability distribution
started to play an important role in the interpretation of physical phenomena.
It is then possible to say that the origin of two main physical theories of the 20th
century (i.e., Copenhagen quantum mechanics and special relativity theory) was influ-
enced fundamentally by E. Mach (1838-1916), who refused any metaphysics in physical
considerations [2]. Thus the purely phenomenological mathematical models were strongly
preferred and the modern physics was built up practically on them.
As to the quantum mechanics it is well known that the contemporary model leads to
logical quantum paradoxes and that until now the sharp gap between the microphysics
and macrophysics has not been removed, either. We have analyzed the basis of quantum
mechanics and its reasoning to a much greater detail in the last time; see [1,3] and papers
quoted there. And we have shown that the Schro¨dinger equation itself (without any
additional assumptions) must be preferred to the Copenhagen quantum mechanics as
well as to mere classical physics, even if there is not any difference in the description of
stable objects with the help of Schro¨dinger or classical equations. Thus, the so-called
hidden-variable theory represents the best description of physical reality (see also Sec. 5).
And we may conclude that also in the microscopic world the corresponding ontological
model is to substitute the purely phenomenological Copenhagen mathematical model. All
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earlier quantum paradoxes disappear and the microscopic physics may be interpreted in
intuitive ontological way as the macroscopic one. Also the interpretation gap between
microscopic and macroscopic physical regions disappears [3].
The preference of ontological models in natural science seems to be strongly supported
in such a case, which will be discussed to a greater detail in the next section.
5 Mathematical modeling of natural processes
It is possible to say that any research concerning the matter world (including human
society) cannot manage without using mathematical models, being partly very simple
and partly very complex. They were introduced into the life by G. Galileo (1564-1642)
and I. Newton (1643-1727). Their models may be denoted as ontological. Sometimes
it is spoken about such models as about mechanistic ones, to stress that they should
represent matter mechanism hidden behind, at the difference to purely phenomenological
representation of measured values.
The contemporary physical theories are based, of course, practically fully on phe-
nomenological models, without devoting any interest to deeper matter (ontological) mech-
anisms. One obtains mostly quite non-intuitive description of corresponding phenomena
in such cases. The quantum paradoxes (wave-particle duality, non-localization of micro-
scopic particles, tunnel phenomenon, and similarly) have been derived with the help of
the phenomenological Copenhagen quantum-mechanical model. Such phenomena have
been denoted oft as the reality of the microscopic world, differing significantly from the
macroscopic one.
Any objections against phenomenological quantum-mechanical models and against
corresponding consequences have been refused by arguing usually that these models have
been very successful in passing to technological applications. It holds, however, to the
extent when the interpolation in the region of measured values is being performed. Differ-
ent unsuccessful cases may be shown if the extrapolation outside the region of measured
values has been done. Such failure has not been exhibited as a rule when ontological
models have been made use of.
The abandoning and refusing of ontological approaches must be denoted as a mistake
also from another reason. It would not be possible to speak about scientific thinking
or approach if the already mentioned two-value logic were not involved. And Aristotle
proposed just this kind of logic starting in principle from the ontological basis of the
matter world.
Some efforts to introduce more-value logics appeared in the 20th century. However,
the attempts to apply them to natural phenomena in connection with quantum mechanics
were unsuccessful. And there is not any reason for it, either, since we have shown that the
quantum theory must be based on the mere Schro¨dinger equation (as introduced already
in Sec. 4), which provides the results for stable microscopic objects to be practically
equivalent to classical physics [3]. It is the theory with hidden parameters supported all
the time by A. Einstein that must be applied to if the microscopic phenomena are to be
described in agreement with reality [1,3].
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6 Physics and metaphysics
As there is not any reason for a more-value logic the way is again fully open for applying
ontological considerations in extending our knowledge. Especially, when commonly used
standard logical rules represent practically indivisible part of any scientific approach.
It is also the intuitive insight that is to come back into the natural science. It may be
hardly possible to interpret further the real world by manipulating mathematical artifacts
that are usually linked up with phenomenological models. There is not any doubt that
the actual knowledge of the world should be connected with ontological models. One is
entitled to expect that a similar synthesis of scientific and philosophical (metaphysical)
thinking may occur again as it was in the time of Aristotle and also of the middle age.
However, the other philosophical region (i.e., theological philosophy) introduced in the
middle age need not be influenced very much in such a case as it has a quite different
starting point than natural science. It starts from the Judaic-Christian revelation that is
contained in the books of Old and New Testament. The theological philosophy combines,
of course, its conclusions also with the pieces of knowledge obtained on the basis of
world observation, which means that we are entitled to apply the standard falsification
approach to corresponding theologically oriented statements as far as they concern the
world and human being. It means that also in this region some plurality of mutually
contradicting opinions may exist when none of them was falsified separately. It is possible
to lead a dialogue between corresponding statements in looking for a true answer; a kind
of dialectic synthesis may be formulated when the whole known non-falsified ”truth” is
taken into account and falsification does not occur. On the other side some new hypotheses
concerning the matter world might be initiated by corresponding considerations.
7 Microscopic world and sense knowledge
One region of the physics of the 20th century was devoted mainly to the description of
the microscopic world. It was based practically on phenomenological models and the
derived picture of the microworld was very different from that might be obtained by
extrapolating the experience gained with the help of our senses. The ontological models
have commemorated the situation of the intuitive approach started by Demokritos (as
mentioned already in Sec. 3) or developed further mainly by Aristotle and Thomas Aq.
The given picture was supported in principle also by discoveries in the 17th and 18th
centuries when the actual existence of atoms and molecules was discovered.
However, at that time different trends started to appear when instead of ontological
models the phenomenological ones were made use of. Important example may be rep-
resented by the discovery of entropy increase when this phenomenological characteristic
was denoted practically as a natural law or as the cause of corresponding behavior of
many-bodies systems even if it should be interpreted as the consequence of other rules
holding for interactions of individual bodies under given conditions. The situation did not
change even if the entropy increase was substituted by the probability increase of atom
(or molecule) distribution. The given evolution continued when the causality principle
was refused and the chance (and probability) was declared as the basic characteristic of
natural evolution, as Hume proposed it.
Phenomenological models represented always important lost of intuitive insight as to
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the matter structure. N. Bohr contributed then further to such trends when in 1913
he formulated two postulates concerning the atom structure [4]; two phenomenological
characteristics were denoted in principle as physical laws being fully responsible for corre-
sponding physical behavior. To the given evolution also L. de Broglie [5] contributed when
he attributed a pilot wave to any mass particle, for which any ontological reasoning did
not exist. However, N. Bohr brought a decisive contribution to the support of phenomeno-
logical models, when he introduced the Copenhagen quantum mechanics [6]. It was based
on time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation [7], to which, however, some further additional
important (in principle only mathematically formulated) assumptions were added. The
given theory has led then to some paradoxical properties that have been denoted as actual
properties of microworld.
It has been often stated that many experiments have entitled us to take the Copen-
hagen quantum mechanics as actually valid. However, it has been almost always only
the mere Schro¨dinger equation that has been tested in corresponding experiments; none
of the mentioned additional Copenhagen assumptions was actually taken into account in
such tests. And it has been already shown that the basic solutions (i.e., containing only
one Hamiltonian eigenfunction) of the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation have led to
the results that are fully equivalent to those of classical physics [3]. It does not hold for
superposition solutions (involving at least two Hamiltonian eigenfunctions), which makes
the Schro¨dinger equation more general than the equations of classical physics. That is in
full agreement with the conclusions of Hoyer [8] and Ioanidou [9] who showed that the
Schro¨dinger equation may be derived if the classical physics is combined with a statistical
distribution of some basic physical parameters. There are then some experimental facts
(existence of discrete states) indicating that the Schro¨dinger equation should be preferred
to other model alternatives in the region of microscopic world [3].
One may say that the EPR experiment measuring two-photon coincidence was the only
one where the mentioned additional Copenhagen assumptions were actually discussed and
practically tested. However, the violation of Bell’s inequalities found experimentally by
Aspect et al. [10] has been interpreted in such a way that two untrue statements have
been involved; see [1] and papers quoted there. In fact only a simplified hidden-variable
theory may be excluded together with classical alternative by the given experimental data;
the corresponding violation has not concerned the general hidden-variable alternative (or
the general Schro¨dinger equation). It means that nothing prevents us from returning to
intuitive ontological picture of matter structures in the region of microscopic phenomena.
8 Ontological basis and some remaining
phenomenological characteristics
Nevertheless, it is necessary to introduce that the physics is still fully dependent on one
quite phenomenological quantity. It is the distant force action. One may easily imagine
and interpret ontologically the action of a force (repulsive as well as attractive) at very
small distances (objects being in contact). The force action at a distance (electromagnetic
and gravitation forces) may be understood until now on phenomenological level only, even
if it may be practically clearly defined on the basis of corresponding consequences. There
is a quite open (till now unanswered) question how it might be possible to interpret it
ontologically as other physical characteristics. The phenomenological description may be,
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however, made use of, too, when the ontological mechanism of some part of reality is very
complex and for the analysis of the whole system a phenomenological relation is sufficient.
On the other side it is hardly possible to accept an interpretation, even if it is ontologi-
cally based, if some violation of logical principles is involved. Such a problem concerns the
strong interactions (between hadron particles) that may be regarded in principle always as
contact interactions. At the present the hadrons are assumed to consist of smaller quarks
and all mutual interactions between them are interpreted on the basis of interactions
between individual quarks. It follows from experimental data and is practically certain
that hadrons cannot be regarded as elementary objects; they must consist of some smaller
parts, having been denoted commonly as partons. However, one should ask whether these
partons may be identified with contemporary quarks as it is generally assumed.
The quarks are assumed now to have relatively low rest masses and, therefore, they
should be loosed normally as free objects in hadron collisions at sufficiently high ener-
gies. However, only many other secondary hadrons (or their resonances) have been always
found in such collisions. As there has not been any direct evidence for the quark existence
one special property has been attributed to them, which may be described mathemat-
ically but it may be hardly understood ontologically and intuitively. When brought to
high velocities (as parts of an accelerated hadron) and to interactions with other quarks
(present in a different colliding hadron) the pair of mutually interacting quarks has been
assumed to be unable to withdraw oneself from another one. They have been expected to
remain mutually bound and only the process of their hadronization (i.e., transmutation
to hadrons) has been assumed to occur. And one must assume further that even many
tens of secondary hadrons may be formed from one couple of colliding quarks. There is
not any description, either, what occurs with other quarks that do not collide directly.
No explanation (or concrete description) has been given until now for such unusual
phenomenological quark behavior, even if already a very long time has passed from the
time when the given assumption was formulated. And so, even if at the first sight the
existence of quarks might represent quite intuitive approach one is forced to ask whether
their mysterious properties (or rather the mathematical artifacts) do not disqualify them
actually from further considerations. The usual argument that any other explanation
does not exist until now should be denoted as contra-productive (having been untrue at
the same time).
There has been the question put before several decades of years and not answered
until now: whether the secondary hadrons and hadron resonances (appearing in hadron
collisions) are not preformed in individual hadrons before being loosed in a collision. The
mentioned partons might be then identified with these resonances. However, in the past
they were identified in principle with individual quarks representing basic states in SU(3)
theory.
The partons (similarly as all hadrons) might then consist of other smaller objects (i.e.,
of some quasi-quarks). These quasi-quarks should be then very heavy being mutually
strongly bound at very small distances. Different changeable parton structures might
be then formed inside individual hadrons, while individual partons (i.e., contemporary
resonances) might be get free in hadron collisions by different stripping reactions, which
would be followed by the decay of highly excited objects. Very heavy resonances (cor-
responding to partons) might be then formed also in direct mutual collisions of partons
existing in colliding hadrons when also some quasi-quark pairs should be created (or again
annihilated). Jets consisting of many secondary hadrons might be then formed by suc-
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cessive decays of highly excited resonances. Thus, the purely phenomenological quantum
chromodynamics might be substituted by a model more acceptable from purely logical as
well as ontological views.
What remains open is the nature of the corresponding quasi-quarks and of their mutual
interactions. The forces between them must change strongly with their mutual distances
and act mostly in a collective manner. And just this property should be described in a
quite new way. It would be necessary to describe (or explain) also the changeable parton
structure inside individual hadrons during their free existence between mutual collisions
and interactions on the basis of such quasi-quark property.
9 Conclusion
There is not any doubt that the modern physics would not be so successful without
making use of mathematical models. However, one must ask whether the contemporarily
used phenomenological models may really contribute to the true knowledge of the world.
Especially, if they are in disagreement to the knowledge gained with the help of human
senses.
It is evident that our sensual ability leads always to fully ontological view, which
is in agreement with the fact that no science would be possible without using the two-
value logic based on realistic ontological view. It has been introduced in Sec. 7 that
especially the phenomenological model of Copenhagen quantum mechanics has not been
based on realistic grounds. The way has been opened to substitute it by a fully ontological
hidden-variable model [3]. There is not more any actual reason for making use of purely
phenomenological models at the present time, either.
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